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COMMENTARY
PRIVATE CLUBS AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: A
VIEW FROM SAN FRANCISCO*
HERMA HILL KAY**
The issue of sex segregation in private clubs has become a particularly
heated one in San Francisco. Virtually all of the city's exclusive all-male
clubs have experienced internal debates over whether to admit women
during the past two years. Some have held membership votes on the
matter as well. A few of these clubs have voted to end their discrimina-
tory admission policies, but others, including the Olympic Club, have
voted to continue their exclusionary practices. San Francisco is also the
home of several elite all-female clubs. Although the issue of excluding
men as members has been discussed by the boards of directors of some of
these clubs, no membership vote has been taken on the question.
Professor Buss has clearly set out the constitutional principles devel-
oped in the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions concerning
"public private" clubs.' As he noted, these principles have been devel-
oped against the factual background of two men's civic and service clubs,
the Junior Chamber of Commerce (Jaycees) and Rotary International.2
The Court's most recent decision, New York State Club Association v.
City of New York,3 dealt only with the facial validity of New York City's
Local Law No. 63, which defined as "not distinctly private" any club
that "has more than 400 members, provides regular meal service and
regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services,
meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmem-
bers for the furtherance of trade or business."4 The Court sustained the
New York law against a facial constitutional attack. It noted, however,
* This commentary was given at Washington University School of Law on September 30,
1988, as part of a conference commemorating the fortieth anniversary of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
** Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
I. Buss, Discrimination by Private Clubs, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 815 (1989).
2. Id. at 828-32.
3. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
4. Id. at 2230.
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that any individual club will have the opportunity "to contest the consti-
tutionality of the Law as it may be applied against them" in judicial re-
view of the administrative enforcement proceedings on a "case-by-case
review of specific facts."' Several San Francisco clubs have chosen to
"privatize" their operations in the hope of making a favorable showing in
the event they are required to undergo such a "case-by-case review." I
will briefly comment on some of these strategies for compliance with the
laws prohibiting discriminatory membership practices because they may
have application in other communities. I will conclude with a brief ex-
amination of whether it is legally possible, or wise, to draw a distinction
between all-female and all-male clubs in this context.
Two laws bear on the membership practices of San Francisco clubs.
City Attorney Louise Renne has invoked both provisions in the city's
suit challenging the Olympic Club's discriminatory practices. The first is
a state statute known as the Unruh Civil Rights Act.6
The Unruh Act provides in part that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdic-
tion of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race,
color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever."7 The California
Supreme Court has interpreted the Unruh Act very expansively. In Is-
bister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc.,8 the court held that the statutory
phrase "business establishments of every kind whatsoever" included non-
profit places of public accommodation. The Boys' Club of Santa Cruz
had been established by private gift; it was chartered as a private non-
profit corporation, and was affiliated with the Boys' Clubs of America, a
congressionally chartered organization. The Boys' Club of Santa Cruz
owned and operated a building which included such recreational facilties
as a gymnasium, an indoor competition-size swimming pool, a snack bar,
and a craft and game room. Its membership was open to all Santa Cruz
boys between the ages of eight and eighteen, upon payment of a $3.25
annual fee. The California Supreme Court reasoned that the Club was a
place of public accommodation and amusement with unrestrictive mem-
bership policies, except for the exclusion of females, and was therefore
5. Id. at 2235.
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982).
7. Id.
8. 40 CaI.3d 72, 707 P.2d 212, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1985).
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subject to the Unruh Act.9 In Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Direc-
tors, affirmed on constitutional grounds by the United States Supreme
Court, the California Court of Appeals invoked Boys' Club to hold as a
matter of state law that the Rotary Club of Duarte was also covered by
the Unruh Act. 1
In the Olympic Club litigation, Judge Maxine Chesney denied the
city's motion for a preliminary injunction against the Club on October 5,
1988, holding that the question whether the Club is public or private
under the Unruh Act could be decided only after trial.
The second provision that applies to San Francisco clubs is San Fran-
cisco Municipal Code Article 33B.'1 City Attorney Renne stated in her
amicus curiae brief filed with the United States Supreme Court in New
York State Club that Article 33B, like New York's Local Law No. 63, "is
a measured and carefully crafted effort to prohibit discrimination by
clubs whose activities in promoting business are invested with the same
public nature and interests as business establishments now subject to
other anti-discrimination measures."1 2 Like Local Law No. 63, Article
33B defines as "not distinctly private" any club which:
1. Has membership of whatever kind totalling 400 or more; and
2. Provides regular meal service by providing, either directly or indirectly
under a contract with another person, any meals on three or more days per
week during two or more weeks per month during six or more months per
year; and
3. Regularly accepts payments:
(a) from non-members for dues or expenses incurred at the club by
members or non-members in furtherance of trade or business, or
(b) on behalf of non-members for expenses incurred at the club by non-
members in the furtherance of trade or business. 13
The City Attorney's office decided to await the United States Supreme
Court decision in New York State Club before commencing proceedings
to enforce Article 33B. When the Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion on June 20, 1988, however, Renne indicated to the press that she
was confident that the San Francisco provision would be sustained by the
Court's reasoning. Her office has sent interrogatories to the San Fran-
9. Id. at 91, 707 P.2d at 224-25, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
10. 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1986), aff'd, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
11 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., MUN. CODE art. 33B (1987).
12. Brief for the City and County of San Francisco as amicus curiae at ii. New York State Club
Assoc. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
13. Id.
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cisco clubs to obtain detailed information about their financial opera-
tions. Early in January, 1989, the city amended its complaint against the
Olympic Club to include a charge that the Club is in violation of the San
Francisco ordinance.
Article 33B was enacted by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors
on November 12, 1987. The vote was preceded by public hearings which
received wide press coverage. City Attorney Renne stated in her amicus
brief that "Article 33B represents the manifest policy of San Francisco to
eliminate the barriers of discrimination that impede the professional ad-
vancement of women and minorities."14 The testimony and news stories
identified the prominent San Francisco men's clubs, particularly the Bo-
hemian Club, the Pacific-Union Club, and the Olympic Club, as the pri-
mary targets of Article 33B. Those clubs naturally began considering
possible avenues of response, and the largest all-female club, the Metro-
politan Club, did so as well. A few of the men's clubs, after lengthy
internal debate, voted to admit women as members. These clubs include
the University Club, which voted in September 1988 to admit women,
and the Concordia-Argonaut Club, which took similar action in 1987.
The Olympic Club, however, took a membership vote and decided to
retain its exclusionary policy.
The Bohemian Club, oddly enough, is the only one of the men's clubs
to have its exclusionary policy explicitly stated in its club by-laws. A
vote of 90% of the total membership, approximately 2300 men, is neces-
sary to amend the by-laws. The Bohemian Club has attempted to enjoin
the enforcement of Article 33B.
Two clubs, the all-male Pacific-Union Club and the all-female Metro-
politan Club, have taken the lead in an effort to comply with Article 33B
by becoming "distinctly private." These clubs no longer accept payment
of either club dues or bills for food and entertainment from non-mem-
bers. Nor do they permit the use of club facilities for business meetings.
The clubs urge members not to seek reimbursement from their employers
for club expenses. Such a policy prevents members from treating the
costs of membership as a business expense and therefore may result in a
severe loss of income to the clubs. Since all of the San Francisco clubs
maintain large buildings in expensive areas of the city, complete with
dining facilities, overnight accommodations, athletic facilities, and func-
tion rooms, this policy will put an increased burden on members to sus-
14. Id. at i-i.
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tain each club. The financial pressure of a sincere effort to "privatize" is
thought to have been one of the primary factors that led to the University
Club's decision to admit women members.
The smaller women's clubs, with membership hovering around the 400
level, include the Francisca Club, the Town and Country Club, and the
Century Club. These clubs are primarily luncheon clubs; they do not
have as large a financial overhead as most of the other organizations.
Neither the Unruh Act nor Article 33B exempt all-female clubs from
their coverage. Both provisions speak broadly of exclusion based on
"sex." Is there legal justification for a decision to limit enforcement of
these provisions to men's clubs? In considering that question, it is help-
ful to begin with the theme of this conference: the competing interests of
individual freedom and governmental power. As Professor Buss made
clear, the justification for the use of governmental power to limit the
right of individuals to choose their intimate associates is the overriding
public policy of ending discrimination based on sex. 5 Professor
Deborah Rhode succinctly phrased the problem: "The exclusion of wo-
men from spheres conventionally classified as private contributes to wo-
men's exclusion from spheres unquestionably understood as public."' 6
The context of female exclusion from clubs like the Bohemian Club or
the Olympic Club-with memberships numbering in the thousands and
where business contacts are made at the highest level, even if no deals are
made at the table-is quite different from male exclusion from clubs like
the Metropolitan Club-where a membership base among younger busi-
ness and professional women is only recently developing. This context
reflects the division of power between men and women in the business
world and the larger society. To quote Rhode again: "In a male-domi-
nated society, the price of male cohesiveness is substantial .... [I]n the
current social order, we cannot maximize both male intimacy and female
opportunity." 17
This line of argument suggests that women are free to continue to asso-
ciate with each other in female-only clubs so long as the sexual balance of
power remains unchanged. Whether women should continue to exercise
that right, however, is a different matter. Once again, the context in
which the decision is made is significant. Women's networking groups
are a valuable source of business and professional contacts. Very few of
15. Buss, supra note 1, at 83941.
16. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 106, 120 (1986).
17. Id. at 124-25.
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these groups have club buildings and physical facilities to maintain.
Truly social clubs, like some of the San Francisco women's luncheon
clubs, are not places where business contacts are initiated or cultivated.
Conversely, when a club counts among its membership large numbers of
wealthy and powerful men, like the Pacific-Union Club, even a sincere
effort to become "privatized" cannot remove the fact that access to the
powerful is a valuable asset. Until there are large numbers of wealthy
and powerful women, the exclusion of men from their table conversation
will not be a disadvantage.
Let me say a final word about the implementation of decisions recog-
nizing that women cannot be excluded from men's clubs. We are at pres-
ent witnessing efforts on the part of men in New York, Washington, San
Francisco and Los Angeles, as well as in other cities, to attract women to
formerly all-male clubs. Women who accept these invitations should re-
alize that getting in the door is only the first step. As Irene Vacchina has
learned from the Press Club in San Francisco and Gloria Allred has
learned from the Jonathan Club in Los Angeles, getting into the steam
room or the swimming pool may be much harder. Defiant male mem-
bers of the Press Club began swimming in the nude to protest a San
Francisco judge's order that the Club cease its practice of restricting the
hours that women could use the pool and locker room. Allred has gone
to court to compel the Jonathan Club to permit her to use the steam
room, after she was allegedly informed by the manager that she could
only go in naked, just as the men did. It seems clear that, as we move
toward the integration of men's clubs, unexpected problems may arise
that will test still further the meaning of privacy.
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